Politics, it is said, is the art of the possible. So, it is possible for General Ibrahim Babangida to emerge as a candidate for the 2007 presidential election. But this, I believe is highly unlikely. IBB, as Babangida is widely known, is just playing the games he knows how to play best. Courting attention at all cost, and keeping people guessing as to his real intentions.
A critical reflection would show that a serious IBB aspiration for the presidency would be foolhardy. A journey into self-destruction. The forces arrayed against any such bid are too formidable, the resources that would be required too enormous and the political soldiers coalescing around him too useless for the dream to be realised.
The IBB soldiers as we are seeing in the media are nothing but mercenaries. On board only for pecuniary benefit in the immediate. And mercenaries, according to Niccolo Machiavelli are not only useless but also dangerous.
This Italian, writing in The Prince, a treatise Babangida reportedly made his manual of governance while in power advised against the use of soldiers of fortune.
He said: "The fact is, they (mercenaries) have no other attraction or reason for keeping the field than a triffle of stipend, which is not sufficient to make them willing to die for you. They are ready to be your soldiers whilst you do not make war, but if war comes they take themselves off or run from the foe"
It is too obvious that these IBB campaigners are useless political soldiers. Their activities can only hurt Babangida’s bid – if at all he is serious about it – the more. The cheap trick played with Mubashiru Abiola has succeeded in further radicalising the South West against an IBB comeback, rather than make penetration of the zone easier.
Another testimony to how politically incompetent the IBB group is, is that they have started campaigning without having a candidate. They have focused their energies and strategies on swaying the public, rather than members of their party. In fact, they are presently of no known party. Any serious aspirant would be visible in a party by now.
The truth is that there are two critical moments in the race for 2007 presidency. The first is the conventions at which flagbearers would emerge. The second is the voting day on which the people would cast their ballots. Any wise political strategist would concentrate his plans and moves on winning at these points. And would not start campaigning before being a candidate. Unless he is just being a distraction, which I suspect this IBB aspiration to be.
One of the manuals used by the Army (in the US, and I think there must be a similar one for the Nigerian Army) talked about some principles of war. And the first is "concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time". I am sure being a General, Babangida knows much more about this than we bloody civilians. That is why cheap political gimmicks by his campaigners still amazes not a few.
Of recent, he has been reported as saying that what becomes of his aspiration depends on God. Nothing can be more true than this. But if both sides in a war seek the help of the Almighty with equal fervour, then we can hold what Voltaire said to be true. "God is always on the side of the big battalions". I doubt if IBB’s current political battalion can win a party convention war.
Assuming Babangida clinches a formidable party’s ticket, then would the forces that would do him in, mess him up, demystify him swing into action.
Pro-democracy activists of yore would be back in the trenches. Members of the National Democratic Coalition (NADECO) would regroup. The Abiola clan would take up arms. The media would go historical, and dig up his sins while in office between 1985 and 1993.
The missing Okigbo panel report would resurface. More damaging publications like The Sink would be rolled out. Babangida would need guards to campaign at certain venues. Being a man that is passionately loved and hated, there is no assurance that bullets would not be aimed at him at certain places.
Babangida would have as opponents not only the candidates of the opposition parties, but almost all of civil society. Many politicians who were victims of the protracted transition programme he embarked on while in power, and are in position today, would plot his downfall.
To fight his election, IBB would need more money than the other candidates. People believe, rightly or wrongly, that he is in custody of looted funds. They also take him to be the master of "settlement". So, apart from the mercenaries, many would see a Babangida candidature as a "project" from which millions are to be made without necessarily fulfilling their side of the bargain.
It is laughable to think people will donate generously to an IBB campaign fund. When a man has been reported to have between $12 and $20 billion stashed away somewhere, people with much less do not rush to give him their money for a venture which outcome would be dicey.
Another Machiavelli quote comes into mind at this point. "One should never risk one’s whole fortune unless supported by one’s entire forces"
To seriously fight an election in 2007 against other formidable candidates, Babangida would have to spend, and spend. While not being sure that those who are professing support would not defect at critical periods.
From my own calculations, the IBB aspiration makes no sense. It is a distraction.
